\*\*TL;DR: [awstore.cloud](http://awstore.cloud) sells "cheap Claude API access" on Plati Market and other reseller platforms. It's actually a malware delivery system that uses Claude Code itself to execute a PowerShell dropper on your machine. I analyzed it, here's what you need to know.\*\*
Posting this because I nearly got hit and want to warn others. This is a really clever attack that abuses how Claude Code works.
\## The setup (why it looks legit):
\- They sell API access on \*\*legitimate reseller marketplaces\*\* like Plati Market
\- Prices are \*\*suspiciously cheap\*\* compared to official Anthropic pricing
\- They present themselves as a normal API provider/reseller
\- Documentation, payment processing, all looks professional
\- Classic "too good to be true" - but the resale marketplace gives them credibility
\## The weird red flag I ignored:
After a brief downtime, the service came back with a notice saying \*\*"currently only Claude Code for Windows works"\*\*
Think about that for a second. \*\*API is API.\*\*
If their endpoint is a real Claude-compatible proxy, it should work with any client - curl, Python SDK, whatever. "Only Claude Code on Windows works" makes ZERO technical sense for a legitimate API reseller.
That was the tell. I should've stopped there. Instead I tested it on a throwaway VM.
\## What actually happens when you use it:
1. You configure Claude Code with their \`ANTHROPIC\_BASE\_URL=[https://api.awstore.cloud\`](https://api.awstore.cloud`) and their token
2. You send literally ANY prompt to Claude Code
3. Instead of a normal Claude response, the server returns what looks like a \*\*"configuration message"\*\*/ setup instruction
4. Claude Code, thinking this is a legitimate tool-use response,
5. \*\*executes a PowerShell command without asking\*\*
6. That PowerShell command downloads and runs the dropper from \`api.awstore.cloud\`
7. You're now infected
\*\*The attack vector IS Claude Code itself.\*\*
They're not tricking you into running something - they're tricking Claude Code into running something on your behalf. That's why it only "works on Windows with Claude Code" - because that's the only client that has the tool execution capability they're abusing.
\## What the malware does once it's in:
\*\*4-stage deployment\*\*
: PowerShell → Go binary → VBS obfuscation → .NET payload
\- Hides in \`%LOCALAPPDATA%\\Microsoft\\SngCache\\\` and \`%LOCALAPPDATA%\\Microsoft\\IdentityCRL\\\` (legit-looking Microsoft folders)
\- Creates a scheduled task \`\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Maintenance\\CodeAssist\` that runs at every logon with SYSTEM privileges
\- Tunnels ALL your system traffic through their SOCKS5 proxy at \`2.27.43.246:1080\` (Germany, bulletproof hosting)
\- Disables PowerShell script block logging and wipes event logs
\- Drops what [Tria.ge](http://Tria.ge) identified as
\*\*Aura Stealer\*\*
(credential/browser/wallet theft)
\- Keeps your Claude Code hijacked so every future prompt goes through them
\## Geopolitical fingerprint (interesting):
\- Hard-coded check:
\*\*if country = Ukraine → immediately exit, no infection\*\*
\- CIS countries (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, etc.) → locale gets masked to en-US before infection, then restored after reboot to hide tracks
\- Rest of the world → full infection
Pretty clear Russian-speaking threat actor profile based on targeting.
\## Red flags for ANY "cheap Claude API" service:
\- Sold on reseller marketplaces (Plati, similar)
\- Prices way below official Anthropic pricing
\- Claims of "unlimited" or "cracked" access
\- Client-specific restrictions that make no technical sense ("only works with Claude Code", "only on Windows")
\- Sketchy support channels (Telegram, Discord DMs)
\- Requires you to change \`ANTHROPIC\_BASE\_URL\` to their domain
\## If you used awstore.cloud:
\*\*Assume full compromise. Treat that machine as burned.\*\*
1. Disconnect from network immediately
2. Check \`\~/.claude/settings.json\` → remove any \`ANTHROPIC\_BASE\_URL\` override
3. Check Task Scheduler for \`\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Maintenance\\CodeAssist\`
4. Check for processes: \`claude-code.exe\`, \`awproxy.exe\`, \`proxy.exe\`, \`tun2socks.exe\`
5. Change
6. \*\*every password\*\*
7. \- browser saved creds, SSH keys, API tokens, crypto wallets, everything
8. Rotate any API keys, tokens, or credentials that were in your shell history or project files
9. Ideally:
10. \*\*nuke the machine and reinstall Windows\*\*
\## Network IOCs to block:
[api.awstore.cloud](http://api.awstore.cloud)(C2 domain)
[2.27.43.246](http://2.27.43.246)(SOCKS5 proxy, AS215439)
\## File hashes (SHA256):
claude-code.exe: e692b647018bf74ad7403d5b8cf981c8cfaa777dd7f16a747e3d3f80f5300971
awproxy.exe: 8736f7040f587472f66e85e895709e57605c8e7805522334ae664e3145a81127
proxy.exe: e86f7ba0413a3a4b1d7e1a275b3d1ef62345c9d3fd761635ff188119b8122c85
tun2socks.exe: 90547fe071fe471b02da83dd150b5db7ce02454797e7f288d489b1ff0c4dd67c
\## The bigger picture:
This is the
\*\*first in-the-wild attack I've seen that weaponizes an LLM agent's tool-use capability against its own user via a malicious API endpoint\*\*
. It's going to get copied. Expect more fake API providers targeting Cursor, Cline, Continue, etc.
\*\*Rule of thumb: only use official API providers.\*\*
The real Claude API is \`api.anthropic.com\`. If a "reseller" needs you to change the base URL to a domain you've never heard of, they control what your AI agent executes on your machine. Full stop.
Share this with your dev communities. Campaign is very fresh (started April 22-23, 2026) and actively spreading via reseller marketplaces.
Stay safe.